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Abstract 
 
This paper contributes to the debate on the energy efficiency paradox according to which 
consumers fail to adopt cost-effective, energy efficient technologies over less efficient 
technologies and therefore fail to reduce energy consumption. Both traditional and 
behavioural theories are used to investigate the decision-making process of residential 
consumers with empirical evidence based upon a specially designed quasi-experimental 
survey of 784 households on the decision to connect to a  district-heating system, a more 
energy efficient alternative to individual heating systems. The results suggest an internal 
discount rate of around 36 per cent for homeowners, a signal that consumers undervalue 
future energy costs. We also find the household’s decision to be negatively affected by 
years of payback up to around 7-8 years. Our findings suggest that neglecting consumer 
inattention and heuristics can lead to biases which cast doubt on the existence of the 
energy efficiency paradox. We believe that these results help to explain why some 
consumers are unlikely to invest in energy efficient technology, particularly those on low 
incomes. 
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1 Introduction 
Following the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, which entered into force in November 
2016, Governments across the world have been implementing policies to reduce energy 
consumption and greenhouse gas emission with mixed success. The European Union’s (EU) 
and the United Kingdom’s (UK) Government have been particularly active in promoting 
policies for increased environmental sustainability, underpinned by the 2030 emission 
reduction targets of 40% (European Commission, 2013) and 57% below 1990s levels 
(Climate Change Committee, 2017). Improving energy efficiency in the residential sector 
(which produces around 13% of total direct greenhouse gas emissions) is one of the areas of 
policy intervention which have witnessed limited success (CCC, 2016b). In the UK 
residential consumers’ uptake of cost reducing technologies has slowed down particularly 
since 2012 (CCC, 2016b), partly as a result of cuts in subsidies for renewable technologies. 
This could be interpreted as evidence of the so-called ‘energy efficiency paradox’ (see 
Gillingham and Palmer (2013) and Gerarden et al.(2015) for recent reviews). 
According to the energy efficiency paradox consumers’ failure to adopt cost-effective, 
energy-efficient technologies over more inefficient ones is arguably a phenomenon which 
hinders society’s efforts to reduce energy consumption and CO2 emissions (Jaffe and Stavins, 
1994). This paper contributes to the literature on this perceived paradox by investigating the 
decision making process leading to the adoption of energy efficient technologies (Battisti 
1998, Kesidou and Demirel 2012, Menanteau and Lefebvre, 2000, Stoneman and Battisti 
2000). The novel contribution of the paper consists of extending the traditional neoclassical 
approach through the inclusion of more recent behavioural concepts such as heuristics and 
inattention.  
Hausman (1979)’s seminal paper emphasised the tendency for consumers to purchase low-
cost technologies and reject the more expensive yet efficient alternatives which can deliver a 
profitable stream of discounted net savings. He argued that consumers’ reluctance to adopt 
energy efficient technologies is internally consistent with the traditional neoclassical 
economic theory, according to which consumers discount the future financial benefits from 
the use of the technology too heavily making adoption less attractive. The literature has 
indeed confirmed this (Jaffe at al 2004) and a stream of research has since developed looking 
at intertemporal decision making and at the different nature of the discount rate, e.g. 
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hyperbolic discounting (Pearce et al. 2003, Frederick et al., 2002; Laibson, 1997, Hepburn et 
al., 2010) or social discount rate, typically applied to public policy interventions (Groom et 
al., 2005; Stern, 2007). 
More recently, economists have offered behavioural theories to explain the energy efficiency 
paradox, describing consumer choices as systematically deviating from the rational behaviour 
depicted in the neoclassical theory of consumption. They argue that consumers often simplify 
complex tasks for example by using simpler ‘heuristic’ estimates of the expected savings. 
Accordingly, simple ‘rules-of-thumb’ or quick-fire tactics used to help navigate complex 
decision-making scenarios (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974; Kahneman, 2011), might lead to 
the choice of inefficient technologies over profitable alternatives (Allcott, 2011; Attari et al., 
2010).  Behavioural theory has also identified ‘inattention’ as another deviation from the 
neoclassical assumptions of decision based on full information: due to lack of interest and 
systematic bias in beliefs. Jointly they make the cost of becoming fully informed about the 
costs of adoption and the characteristics of the technology so high that consumers overlook 
energy efficient technologies (Davis and Metcalf, 2015, Sallee, 2014, Reis, 2006). 
In order to explore the validity of both the neoclassical arguments and the relevance of 
behavioural concepts, such as heuristics and inattention, in the adoption decision, we have 
carried out an ad-hoc and novel quasi-experimental survey, with the inclusion of a contrastive 
vignette experiment, to assess the factors affecting the decision to adopt an energy efficient 
technology, district heating (DH), by residential consumers in Birmingham, the second 
largest city in the UK.  DH is a technology that was prevalent in the early 1900s and has 
exhibited a revival in the 1970s, especially in high rising social housing establishments, and 
in recent decades (Citizens Advice, 2016): around 200,000 residences were connected to one 
of 2,000 networks in the UK in 2015 (DECC, 2015). We have chosen this technology 
because of its great emission reduction potential, as up to 20% of heat demand could be met 
by DH schemes in order to meet emission targets (CCC, 2016). 
 The empirical approach taken in this paper adds to the experimental economics and policy 
literature by proposing a method which evaluates the impact of behavioural biases on 
consumers’ preferences towards impure public goods.  The presence of ancillary additional 
private benefits and externalities to the provision of a mixed rather than pure public good, 
such as reductions in environmental pollution, does play a key role in achieving 
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environmental targets and in the successful implementation of environmental policies 
(Cornes and Sandler, 1984, Finus and Rubbelke, 2013 and Kotchen, 2006). Our findings 
significantly contribute to the understanding the factors which affect households’ decisions to 
adopt an environmentally friendly technology and provide important policy insights on how 
to stimulate the adoption of sustainable technologies that are key to the generation of public 
returns to environmental policies. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: in the next section the paper reviews the 
key literature on the energy efficiency paradox, inattention and heuristics. Section 3 outlines 
the data and experimental design followed by the empirical strategy in Section 4. The 
analysis is presented in Section 5 before providing concluding remarks and the implications 
for policy in Section 6. 
2 Literature on the energy efficiency paradox 
Discounting lies at the heart of policy and intertemporal decision-making. Discount rates 
serve the central purpose of transforming future costs into present terms in cost-benefit 
analyses (Weitzman, 2001). They also describe different forms of consumers’ preferences 
over time, including procrastination (Fischer, 1999) and addiction (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 
1999). The energy efficiency paradox (EEP) states that consumers behave as if they applied 
high discount rates1 when confronting the trade-off between the upfront acquisition costs and 
the costs of operating the technology (Jaffe et al., 1994).  
Hausman’s (1979) seminal paper in this area concluded that consumers’ reluctance to adopt 
energy efficient technologies could be considered internally consistent, in line with the 
neoclassical economic theory of rational consumer behaviour based on cost minimising and 
utility maximising considerations with full information. Similar rational models were 
presented by McFadden (1984) and Goett (1978) who sought to create models of consumer 
                                                 
1 High internal discount rates are consistent with theories of intertemporal decision-making which are variants 
of the neo-classical assumption that decisions are underpinned by exponential discounting (Samuelson, 1937). 
Hyperbolic discounting in particular implies that discount rates are relatively high for decisions made over short 
time horizons and diminish for those made over long time horizons (see, e.g., Frederick et al., 2002; Laibson, 
1997). Reversals of (or time-inconsistent) preferences are not only consistent with the systematic undervaluing 
of energy efficiency, but also underpin behaviour related to resource depletion, addiction, procrastination and 
low saving rates (Hepburn et al., 2010). 
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decision making which involve comparing acquisition costs with the long run operating costs 
of the technology, thus enabling the estimation of the internal discount rate, a key parameter 
which translates future returns from the use of the technology into present values (Gillingham 
et al., 2009).  
This approach forms the cornerstone of the energy efficiency paradox literature and the 
mainstream literature has indeed supported the neoclassical argument demonstrating how 
consumers often discount future financial benefits too heavily. Gillingham et al. (2009)’s 
literature survey reveals that the estimated discount rate ranges between 25% to more than 
100%, depending on the technology. While these values are generally greater than the market 
rate of return, their calculation incorporates standard neo-classical assumptions of consumer 
behaviour and is therefore able to theoretically justify why the paradox might exist under 
optimising behaviour (Loewenstein and Thaler, 1989; Jaffe and Stavins, 1994). Despite its 
importance, the presence of an energy efficiency paradox in the decision to adopt a 
technology by UK households has never been investigated, with the exception of Cohen et al. 
(2015). Hence we posit that for the adoption of energy efficient technologies in the UK the 
discount rate significantly deviates from the market rate of interest:  
 
Hypothesis 1a: Consumers discount the financial benefits accrued from the use of energy 
efficient technologies too heavily, i.e. their internal discount rates are significantly higher 
than the market rate of interest (classical energy efficiency paradox). 
We would also expect that, if present, relatively high discount rates would underestimate the 
future stream of benefits associated to the use of the energy efficient technology leading to a 
low adoption rate: 
Hypothesis 1b: The adoption of energy efficient technology is negatively affected by the 
consumer’s estimate of the discounted future stream of financial benefits associated with its 
use (traditional economic approach to consumer behaviour). 
In the past decade behavioural theories have been developed to describe why choices can 
deviate from the traditional ‘rationality’ assumption based on full information about the 
characteristics, costs of adoption and performance of the technology. Allcott (2011) for 
example finds that around 40% of consumers do not consider fuel costs in their calculations 
when deciding to purchase an automobile but look at factors such as shape, colour, age, size, 
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etc. This decision making approach has been shown to be adopted in the markets for 
appliances (Davis and Metcalf, 2016; Newell and Siikamäki, 2014), automobiles (Sallee, 
2014) and lightbulbs (Allcott and Taubinsky, 2015). Evidence would also suggest that, when 
undertaking a task, inattention is likely to increase with effort (Gabaix and Laibson, 2006), 
competing stimuli and/or shrouded information (Della Vigna, 2009). Hence, as attention is 
scarce and collecting information is costly, decisions will not be taken under full information. 
An alternative explanation to the lack of full information in decision making is that search 
and information acquisition is undertaken if and only if its benefits are perceived to outweigh 
the costs (Reis, 2006). Hence, some consumers might decide to remain inattentive and 
overlook energy efficient technologies if the expected discounted savings do not justify the 
effort of becoming fully informed (Sallee, 2014), or indeed if energy costs are very low and 
competitive (which is not the case in the UK) and/or in the absence of taxation on energy 
consumption, the cost of adopting efficient behaviours is higher than the expected future 
benefits whatever discount rate is used. As suggested by the literature on switching,  
consumers often have a negative attitude towards changing supplier, e.g. electricity, 
telephone, insurance, irrespective of the size of the financial benefits associated with it 
(Gamble et al. 2009 and Deller et al. 2017). Such inattention-based consumer inertia often 
leads to stick with providers or default tariffs that are least beneficial (Sitzia et al. 2015). In a 
context similar to ours, i.e. energy related decision making based on financial considerations, 
Hortacsu et al. (2017) provide evidence on the decision to switch energy supplier in the US, a 
country with relative low energy cost. Their analysis leads to the conclusion that inattention 
bias is an important driver of the decision not to seek alternative suppliers, based on the 
understanding that inattention “represents factors such as psychic search costs and not having 
information, or being willing to gather information, about alternatives”.’  Hence, we posit 
that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The adoption of an energy efficient technology is negatively affected by the 
consumers’ lack of complete information about the true characteristics, returns and 
performance of the technology (inattention approach). 
 
An alternative behavioural approach to the traditional energy efficiency paradox is cognitive 
bias, known also as heuristics, which refers to the use of simplifying methods of performance 
measurement used when deciding among different alternatives. Kempton and Montgomery 
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(1984) provide valuable insights into how consumers use rules-of-thumb when purchasing 
efficient technologies, such as relying on annual energy bills instead of the amount of energy 
consumed or using the payback period rather than the net present value.  Numerous 
laboratory experiments have confirmed that consumers often simplify complex tasks, thus 
making decisions which are inconsistent with those expected of rational utility-maximising 
consumers with full information (Kahnemann and Tversky, 1974; Kahnemann, 2011). 
Experimental studies in the automobile sector have for example shown how consumers are 
confused by changes in fuel efficiency, since on average consumers perceive gas 
consumption as decreasing linearly (instead of non-linearly) with miles-per-gallon (MPG) 
(Allcott, 2011).  Similarly, Attari et al. (2010) suggest that consumers to some extent 
overestimate the potential savings associated with low-energy intensive activities and 
substantially underestimate the energy savings associate with durable appliances.  
Taken together these studies suggest that simplified measures are likely to be used and to 
induce bias in the judgment. Most of the studies cited above are located in the US, which 
could potentially question the generality of inattention in other contexts. Inattention could be 
symptomatic of specific government policy, natural resource availability or general financial 
and economic conditions in which the consumers find themselves and therefore could be site 
specific. Hence, we control for location effects, energy costs, socio-economic characteristics 
and housing attributes in order to posit that, ceteris paribus, heuristic measures affect the 
consumers’ likelihood to install a technology, or more precisely: 
Hypothesis 3: Consumer behaviour falls in line with simplified measures of returns and they 
negatively affect the likelihood of adoption of an energy efficient technology (heuristic 
approach). 
Finally, our inattention and heuristic measures could be a significant source of unobserved 
heterogeneity which, if not explicitly accounted for, could inflate the classical estimates of 
the internal discount rate. Existing studies have highlighted the potential relationship between 
inattention and heuristics and the likelihood of technology adoption, but they do not directly 
investigate the extent to which they affect the makeup and magnitude of the EEP. Hence in 
this paper we explore for the first time how the direct effect of inattention and heuristic 
influence, if at all, consumers’ decision making.  
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3 Survey data and experimental design 
This study uses the case of District Heating (DH) schemes, an alternative energy efficient 
technology which supplies heat and electricity typically from centralised Combined Heat and 
Power (CHP) plants to a wide range of buildings. CHP is efficient due to the process of 
recycling waste heat recovered from electricity generation, producing hot water and steam to 
transport through a network of underground insulated pipes (BEIS, 2017a). DH has been 
identified as a cost-effective approach to reducing CO2 emissions in cities worldwide (UNEP, 
2015). The associated carbon savings and efficiency gains vary however with several key 
variables, including heat density, fuel supply mix, generation mode, building types, and 
regulatory model (CCC, 2017; Munksgaard et al., 2005; Rezaie and Rosen, 2012; Routledge 
and Williams, 2012).  
In order to test the validity of the three theories of consumer behaviour discussed above, a 
telephone experimental survey was carried out across residential customers in Birmingham in 
order to investigate how likely they were to connect to a local DH scheme should it become 
available in the near future 2 . An independent marketing company utilised proportionate 
sampling with simple random sampling and used Random Digit Dialling (RDD) within each 
area code to contact survey participants from a frame of households listed and unlisted in the 
telephone directory. The screening process restricted the sample to adults who are at least 
partially responsible for the household’s bills and thereby most likely to be involved in the 
household’s investment decisions. Between May and June 2014, a random sample of 784 
households stratified proportionately by postcode, where each household is selected with 
equal probability3, was collected. 
The experimental survey used contrastive vignette technique (CVT) to investigate 
consumers’ attitudes towards installing energy efficient technologies. CVT is an indirect-
structured method of attitude elicitation which exploits between-group variation to evaluate 
the effect on the participants’ response of a systematic change in the elements within a 
                                                 
2 Birmingham’s DH scheme does not currently supply private residential consumers but extension to residential 
consumers is being considered, not least because of its high heat (and population) density, access to low-carbon, 
local energy sources (e.g. biomass, CHP) and political appetite (Birmingham City Council, 2013). 
3 A Chi2 test of equal proportions of the sample and population postcodes cannot be rejected at the 1 or 5% level 
(p-value=0.06). Hence sampling weights are equivalent to a simple random ‘self-weighted’ sample. 
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scenario (Alexander and Becker, 1978). One of the advantages of CVT is that it emulates a 
scenario in which a real-life decision is made; CVT is particularly appealing when a decision 
cannot be observed, such as the decision to participate in a DH scheme (Wason, et al., 2002). 
A single vignette describing the capital costs and environmental benefits of DH was allocated 
to each participant, while randomly varying the values of DH costs in order to determine the 
effect of capital costs, prices and profitability of investment (Table 1). The experiment 
randomly allocates one of two scenarios: (1) a fully functional boiler and one that needs 
replacing 4 . Furthermore, for each cost element the: (2) interface cost (equivalent to a 
replacement boiler), (3) average annual bill 5  and (4) maintenance cost was randomised. 
Therefore, costs 2, 3 and 4 varied across three respective levels, creating 27 distinct vignettes. 
To alleviate bias, the order in which the investment costs and benefits were allocated to the 
participants was randomised (Cues 2 and 3).  
  
                                                 
4 The scenarios are introduced to control for the impact of sunk investment costs (endowment effects) on the 
decision. 
5 The values simulate a ‘low’ (£550), ‘medium’ (£700) and ‘high’ (£800) yearly heating bill scenario and are 
representative of a competitive DH scheme (Which?, 2015).6 It is assumed that the network infrastructure and 
meter replacement costs are borne by the district heating provider and recouped through the household’s energy 
bills. Nevertheless it is important to acknowledge that pricing mechanisms applied by the network providers can 
vary across countries (e.g. some Scandinavian district heat systems operate on a not-for-profit basis) and 
depending on whether each property has a HIU or a unit is shared between multiple properties (AECOM, 2017). 
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Table 1: Experimental attributes and cues 
 
In the UK a DH heat interface unit (HIU) – which gives the household access to heat and hot 
water from the district heating system – costs around £2000 including installation 
(Committee on Climate Change, 2015; DECC, 2015); this case forms the high-end 
benchmark and would be competitive against a standard gas-boiler replacement with an A-
rated level of efficiency (Energy Savings Trust, 2016). The medium-price of £1750 is 
competitive with a slightly cheaper gas-boiler with around 90% efficiency (uSwitch, 2016) 
and lower bound HIU unit cost applied in CCC (2015). The low-price scenario is based on a 
£250 government subsidy, similar to the discount offered in a traditional boiler scrappage 
scheme (Which?, 2015) and the price quoted for non-bulk schemes by DECC(2015). Finally, 
the maintenance costs vary between £100 and 0 with a medium costs of £60 (Which?, 2012). 
    
Heating system scenario (1) Fully functional Needs replacing  
Price levels Low Medium High 
Average yearly bill (2) £550 £700 £800 
Interface cost (3)  £1500 £1750 £2000 
Maintenance cost (4) Free £60 £100 
Cues    
1 We would like to give you some information on district heating, but first please imagine that the 
scenario where your current heating system (1).  
2 District heating is able to transport central and water heating through a network of insulated pipes 
from a local energy source to households in Birmingham. 
An interface unit connects each house to the network replacing the current heat generator whilst 
providing the user control over the amount of heat needed.  
It would offer an environmentally friendly and sustainable alternative to your current heating 
system.  
3 Please imagine a scenario where the yearly bill for heating would be of about (2) for a household 
with average use, interface would cost (3) and  annual maintenance costs are (4). 
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The capital and maintenance costs are modelled such that they are comparable with current 
DH and gas-boiler markets6. 
Overall, the random allocation of the costs worked well, as each cost element has been 
assigned to a nearly equal proportion of the sampled households, as is evident in Table 2. 
Table 2: Summary statistics for experimental variables 
The households’ attitudes towards participating in a DH system are measured on a 5-point 
Likert scale. Nearly half of respondents indicated, on the basis of the cost information 
provided, they were likely to adopt the technology, whereas less than 8% chose ‘definitely 
likely’. In contrast around 18% of the respondents indicated that they were definitely unlikely 
to connect while 17% were unlikely.  Fewer than 8% of respondents were unsure about their 
participation in a DH scheme. Hence, there is an overwhelming preference towards 
connecting to DH in this sample. The experimental survey also contained a number of 
traditional household socio-economic characteristics including information on demographics, 
housing, income and energy use that we use as control variables.  
                                                 
6 It is assumed that the network infrastructure and meter replacement costs are borne by the district heating 
provider and recouped through the household’s energy bills. Nevertheless it is important to acknowledge that 
pricing mechanisms applied by the network providers can vary across countries (e.g. some Scandinavian district 
heat systems operate on a not-for-profit basis) and depending on whether each property has a HIU or a unit is 
shared between multiple properties (AECOM, 2017). 
      
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Yearly bill       
£550 784 0.33 0.47 0 1 
£700 784 0.31 0.46 0 1 
£800 784 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Annual maintenance      
Free 784 0.31 0.46 0 1 
£60 784 0.36 0.48 0 1 
£100 784 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Installation costs      
£1500 784 0.34 0.47 0 1 
£1750 784 0.34 0.47 0 1 
£2000 784 0.32 0.47 0 1 
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Many of the sample statistics for the social and economic variables which are expected to 
influence the household’s decision to connect to a DH scheme are close to the population 
statistics collected in the UK Census (ONS, 2011a; ONS, 2011b) for Birmingham and, to a 
lesser extent, England (see Table A1, Appendix1). Although they refer to two different time 
periods, we find that the main differences between the sample and the Birmingham 
population are the median income and the proportion of single and elderly households. The 
findings therefore may overestimate the likelihood of investing in energy efficient 
technologies as married or co-habiting households are more likely to adopt it, while low-
income and the elderly are less likely to do so (Ameli and Brandt, 2014). Hence the overall 
direction of bias in terms of representativeness is unclear. 
4 Methodology 
Classical theory of residential household’s decision-making 
The classical theory of residential household’s decision-making suggests that the lifetime-
cost (LTC) of installing DH technology is the key driver when deciding whether to adopt the 
suggested technology. In particular, Hypothesis 1 states that high discount rates would 
underestimate the stream of costs associated to the use of the energy efficient technology. To 
calculate the household specific discount rate, we follow Hausman (1979) and model the 
consumer’s choice via the present value of LTC of capital calculated on the basis of the 
annual costs ACi including average bill (DH-BILL) and upfront interface costs UCi of DH7 
(INTERFACE) provided to the survey participants8: 
LTCi= UCi+ACi (1-(1+ρ)-τ)ρ  (1) 
Where the annual cost is discounted at the rate (1-(1+ρ)-τ)
ρ
 with an internal discount rate 𝜌𝜌 and 
lifetime durability 𝜏𝜏 of the HIU. The latent utility function U is specified as follows: 
                                                 
7  DH maintenance costs are consistently found to be insignificant and removed in favour of a more 
parsimonious framework using the full-specification (LR-test: Chi2=0.62, p-value=0.43). 
8 The typical assumptions in the literature are made herein: annual costs do not rise in real terms; the decision to 
connect is irreversible; and the heating system does not depreciate.  
12 
Uci=β1UCi +β2ACi +εi (2) 
Where εi  is the independent and identically distributed error component containing the 
unobserved factors related to the preferences for heating systems for i=1,…,784 households, 
and assumed to follow a standard normal cumulative distribution function Φ. 
The internal discount rate 𝜌𝜌, though unobserved, can be determined using the point at which 
the consumer is indifferent between a marginal change in the annual and upfront costs of DH, 
i.e. following traditional economic theory the marginal rate of substitution (MRS). This is 
done by rearranging Equation (2) with β1UCi on the LHS, dividing throughout by β1 and 
taking the partial derivative with respect to ACi, given the ratio between annual and upfront 
costs is the marginal rate of substitution β1/β2, one arrives at Equation (3): 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = β1
β2
= �
(1-(1+ρ)-τ)
ρ
 �
-1 = 𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀 (3) 
Based on the estimated coefficients 𝛽𝛽1 and 𝛽𝛽2 it is possible to derive the MRS by setting it 
equal to the discount rate DR and solving for the average internal discount rate given a fixed 
lifetime durability of the HIU which we assume, in line with the literature, to be equal to 15 
(Davies and Woods, 2009)9. 
Coefficients β1 and β2  are hypothesised to be less than zero, since it is anticipated that a 
marginal increase in either the upfront costs or energy costs will decrease the probability of 
adoption. According to theory, in the absence of market or internal inefficiencies in the 
consumers’ decisions, the implied discount rate 𝜌𝜌 in (3), will be close to the market rate of 
interest. However, a discount rate exceeding the market rate of interest would imply that 
households excessively weigh the cost of energy efficiency relative to the upfront costs. 
                                                 
9 We also experimented with using 20 and 25 years obtaining very similar results 
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Hence, for Hypothesis 1 to hold we would expect the estimated consumer’s discount rate ρ to 
be larger than the market rate of interest. 
Behavioural theory of consumers’ inattention 
To test whether the adoption of energy efficient technologies is negatively affected by 
consumers’ inattention (Hypothesis 2), we include two proxy vectors of variables.  
The first measure of inattention, is a vector of variables founded on research which indicates 
that consumers chose not to search for information if the benefits do not outweigh the costs 
of both adoption and information acquisition (Allcott, 2011; Palmer and Walls, 2015). 
Building on this line of research, the households’ attentiveness has been measured in our 
survey by asking the following question: ‘What is the minimum you would need to save per 
year before you would consider connecting to district heating, assuming zero upfront costs?’ 
The households selected answers within a specified range or stated a specific amount as  their 
expected savings.  
 
After testing down, we recoded the categories such that the second inattention variable (IN2i) 
is equal 1 if the minimum needed is less than £300, 2 if greater than £300 and 3 if the 
participant responded ‘unsure’. Around 35% of households were uncertain about the 
minimum savings they would require to install DH (Table 3). The coefficient for the second 
category (HIGH UNOBSERVED COSTS) is anticipated to exert a negative impact upon the 
decision to adopt DH, as greater required savings would imply higher unobserved costs and 
lower utility, reducing the likelihood of adoption. In line with Hypothesis 2, it is expected 
that the coefficient associated with the third category (INATTENTIVE COSTS) will be 
negative as an inattentive household will be less willing to participate in DH schemes than 
someone who is interested in seeking a positive level of savings. 
 
Table 3: The ‘minimum needed to connect to district heating’ 
   
Minimum needed 
  1=Less than £300 326 41.6 
2=£300 or more (HIGH UNOBSERVED COSTS) 186 23.7 
3=Not sure (INATTENTIVE COSTS) 272 34.7 
Total 784 100 
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During the survey the participants indicated by which method they would prefer to receive 
additional information regarding DH. The choice of information method was aggregated into 
three groups: 1) direct search methods, which require little effort to receive information, 
including post, email, face-to-face consultation or a telephone call (DIRECT INFO); 2) 
indirect search methods, which require at least some costly search activities, including 
information made available online and a community information day (INDIRECT INFO); and 
3) zero search activity i.e. lack of interest in engaging in any information acquisition about 
the DH technology (INATTENTIVE INFO). 
Heuristic approach 
Hypothesis 3 concerns the heuristic approach and suggests that consumers may behave as if 
they emploied simplified measures of profitability. Thus, an increase in the number of years 
of payback would decrease the probability of connecting to DH. Equation 4 utilises the 
payback period (HEURISTICi) to reflect the households’ perceived risk calculated on the 
basis of current costs and expected annual savings (Kempton and Montgomory, 1984). The 
payback period is defined as follows: 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 −  𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷          (4) 
Where UCi denotes the upfront cost of a HIU, Si represents the expected annual savings, 
calculated by the taking difference between annual costs (ACi) accrued by installing the 
district heating heat interface unit (HIU) and keeping the current heating system (CH). It is 
important to note that the former refers to the values randomly presented to the households 
during the survey whereas the latter represents the households reported energy bills and the 
maintenance costs of their current heating system.  
One potential issue related to the calculation of payback period arises due to the fact that 
around 100 households did not report their energy bills. Following Palmer and Walls (2015), 
this response is used to control for inattention towards energy consumption by including an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the household reported their energy bill and maintenance costs, 
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and 0 otherwise (DONTKNOW COSTS). An estimate of the expected savings was used to 
calculate the payback for the households who could report their annual energy bills.  
 
It is also important to consider negative savings. Obtaining individual energy consumption 
levels for each household prior to the survey was infeasible. To circumvent this problem the 
vignette randomly allocated an estimated DH annual heating bill based on average energy use. 
As a result 431 households could potentially save money by keeping their current heating 
system. This was controlled for by including an indicator variable equal to 1 if savings are 
below zero and 0 otherwise (NEG-SAVINGS). The payback variable has been log 
transformed to control for right skew and potential outliers and categorised into quartiles 
(ranging from low (PBK-Q1) to high (PBK-Q4) to pick up any non-linearity between the 
households’ decision to participate in a DH scheme and the payback period.  
 
To further explore how the relationship between income and energy expenditure might affect 
the uptake of energy efficient technology (Ameli and Brandt, 2014, Michelsen and Madlener, 
2012) we created four indicators of relative income and energy costs which depend on 
whether income or costs are below or above the 60% percentile. They range from low-
income-high-cost (LIHC) ) to high income low costs (HILC), to control for the relative 
impact of poverty and energy affordability on the investment decision (Hills, 2012). The 
Low-Income-High-Cost (LIHC) group is expected to be the least likely to participate in a DH 
scheme due to financial constraints, although this technology would help them reduce the 
burden of high energy bills. On the other hand, those in the high income group tend to be less 
subject to liquidity constraints, more educated and more likely to gather information and 
hence to adopt new technologies. 
 
Estimating equation 
Empirically the paper proceeds by estimating the likelihood of connecting to DH using an 
ordered probit model. The household’s choice towards participating in DH is: 
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Di⟹ j =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
1 =Definitely Unlikely
2=Unlikely
3=Not Sure
4=Likely
5=Definitely Likely
    
The probability (P) of choosing category j is determined by the households’ underlying utility. 
Their decision is ranked between a series of thresholds -∞<α1<…<α4<+∞, located along the 
real line of the continuous utility function, which corresponds to the strength of preference j 
towards participating in DH (e.g. α1 represents the cut-off point between categories 1 and 2). 
The probability of decision j for the full specification is defined using the standard approach: 
P(Di =j) = Φ (αj - CLASSICALi’ β - INATTENTIONi’ δ - HEURISTICi’ ξ –X’i γ ) – 
         Φ (αj-1- CLASSICALi’ β- INATTENTIONi’ δ - HEURISTICi’ ξ –X’i γ )       (5) 
Whereby CLASSICAL, INATTENTION and HEURISTIC are the variables used to capture the 
three potential drivers of the efficiency paradox, Xi is a vector containing socio-economic and 
housing characteristics, while β, δ, ξ and γ are the respective vectors of coefficients.  
The coefficients and thresholds α are estimated in accordance with maximising the following 
log-likelihood function10: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 = ��𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗(𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖=j)P(Di= j)5
𝑗𝑗=1
784
𝑖𝑖=1
 
 
Where Ij is an indicator function equal to 1 if category Di=j is chosen by households i and 
equal to 0 otherwise, while P(Di = j) is the probability of category Di conditional on the 
indicator function. Using this approach it is possible to estimate 𝜌𝜌 while controlling both for 
inattention variables and a heuristic measure of profitability. All specifications include socio-
economic, demographic and housing variables which have been highlighted in the literature 
                                                 
10 The marginal effects are calculated in general by:  𝜕𝜕P(Di= j) 
𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖
= γ[Φ'(𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 - Xi'γ) -  Φ(𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗−1 - Xi'γ)]. 
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as important determinants of household investment in energy efficient technologies. Table 
A2 in  Appendix 1 reports a summary of the variables definitions.  
To account for the fact that tenants have limited agency regarding the purchase and 
installation of heating technologies and landlords have weaker incentives to purchase such 
technologies on their behalf (Gillingham et al., 2012), we use the variable TENANT, which is 
set equal to 1 if the household does not own their home and 0 otherwise. We allow TENANT 
to interact with the key decision variables. However, the likelihood ratio tests suggest the 
interactions with TENANT are jointly significant only for the CLASSICAL variables (LR 
Chi2(2)=5.75, p=0.056) therefore we report only the results for these interactions.  
The variables expected to have a positive influence on technology adoption include: 
homeownership (Gillingham et al., 2012) and education (Michelsen and Madlener, 2012). In 
contrast, variables expected to exert a negative influence include age, particularly over 60 
years (Ameli and Brandt, 2014), marital status, structural imperfections in the property and 
economic inactivity. Intra-regional effects could be positive or negative depending on the 
local socio-economic conditions (Davis, 2010; Michelsen and Madlener, 2012; Mills and 
Schleich, 2012). 
Lastly, an indicator variable is included to control for the household’s prior knowledge of DH 
technology. The effect on adoption could be positive or negative depending on their 
perception of DH technology and of the ability to switch to alternative heating providers. The 
latter may be particularly relevant if a customer is concerned about being locked-in to a high-
cost long-term contract11.  Furthermore, this indicator is interacted with the installation costs 
of DH to capture the effect of the respondents’ perception of the upfront costs of adoption. 
5 Results 
In this section, we investigate the significance of the neoclassical and behavioural theories in 
the decision to adopt an energy efficiency technology and estimate the internal discount rate. 
                                                 
11 Compared to non-district heating networks, the district heating (median) price is lower but exhibits a larger 
variance (CCC, 2016; BEIS, 2017b). Therefore, while UK district heating prices are among the lowest in 
Europe (Werner, 2016) on average, some consumers may be paying relatively high prices (Which?, 2015; 
Citizens Advice, 2016). 
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These findings are then subject to several robustness checks to evaluate the impact of 
heuristics and inattention upon the neoclassical estimate of the discount rate behind the 
decision to adopt. 
Table 4: Income and socio-economic variables 
  
 Sample 
Variable N Mean S.D. Median Min Max 
Income variables       
Annual income 645 22994 18396 18462 2830 201460 
Annual energy costs       
Annual gas bill 683 711.79 431.25 611.56 0 3577.82 
Maintenance costs 558 224.01 893.44 50 0 15000 
Low-income-high-cost indicator     
LILC 784 0.12 0.33 0 0 1 
LIHC 784 0.11 0.31 0 0 1 
HILC 784 0.23 0.42 0 0 1 
HIHC 784 0.22 0.41 0 0 1 
UNDISCLOSED  784 0.33 0.47 0 0 1 
Demographic variables       
NON-OWNER 784 0.65 0.48 0 0 1 
DEGREE 784 0.30 0.46 0 0 1 
ELDERLY 784 0.35 0.48 0 0 1 
SINGLE 784 0.21 0.41 0 0 1 
INACTIVE 784 0.36 0.48 0 0 1 
DAMP 784 0.67 0.47 1 0 1 
KNOWS-DH  784 0.15 0.36 0 0 1 
       
 
Table 5 presents the marginal effects of the ordered probit model used to test hypotheses 1 to 
3. For brevity, we focus on the interpretation of the analysis for the respondents who have 
said to be ‘likely’ to connect to a DH scheme response (Column 4). Column 4 shows that a 
£100 increase in the annual cost and interface cost for DH decreases, as would be expected, 
the probability of being likely to connect to DH by 4.6% and 2.6%, respectively. The effect 
of each coefficient and the joint effect are significant at the 5% level (LR test: Chi2=8.70; p-
value=0.0129). This would support the classical economic view that financial considerations 
are central to the adoption decision (Hypotheses 1a and 1b). 
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In line with Hypothesis 2, the marginal effects suggest that the adoption of energy efficient 
technologies is negatively affected by consumers’ inattention (INATTENTIVE INFO and 
INATTENTIVE COSTS) and its intensity increases with the degree of inattention for both the 
information acquisition medium and the information acquisition cost approach. Firstly, the 
probability of adoption by consumers who are unable to quantify the amount of compensation 
needed to encourage their participation in a DH scheme is 48 percentage points lower than 
for those who would be interested given a reduction in bills equivalent to less than £300. And 
secondly, the probability of adoption for households who prefer not to receive any more 
information is 20 percentage points less than for households who would prefer to be 
contacted directly. Thus, the marginal effects suggest that the household’s lack of interest in 
energy related matters represents a significant barrier which can prevent the uptake of energy 
efficient technologies. 
As stipulated by Hypothesis 3, the number of years required to pay back the outlays for an 
energy efficient technology reduces the consumers’ likelihood to install it. Furthermore, 
Columns 4 and 5 suggest a potential non-linear negative relationship between the payback 
period and the decision to connect. The probability of participating reaches a minimum 
around a payback of 4-5 years for those who are likely to participate, and a payback of 7-8 
years for those who are definitely likely to connect. Akin to Anderson and Newell’s (2002) 
research on the adoption of energy efficient technologies by firms, this paper also finds that 
households potentially ignore the payback information and become increasingly likely to 
connect after the minimum is breached, though they remain less likely to connect compared 
with a payback period of 0-2 years. 
There are several socio-economic variables worth highlighting as significant drivers of the 
decision to connect. For instance, the existence of fuel poverty, as captured by low-income-
high-costs, and living in a home with structural deficiencies are negatively related to being 
likely to participate in a DH scheme. As expected, households containing a resident with high 
educational qualifications and active in the labour market have a higher probability of 
participating in a DH scheme. 
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Table 5: Ordered probit marginal effects for the ‘decision to connect’ to district heating 
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.  
 
 DU U NS L DL 
Experimental Variables Marginal Effects 
TENANT -0.0196 -0.0130 -0.00297 0.0279 0.00773 
 (0.0203) (0.0132) (0.00295) (0.0286) (0.00772) 
DH-BILL 0.0319*** 0.0216*** 0.00509*** -0.0456*** -0.0131*** 
 (0.00862) (0.00610) (0.00165) (0.0124) (0.00377) 
INTERFACE 0.00184 0.00125 0.000293 -0.00263 -0.000753 
 (0.00422) (0.00287) (0.000675) (0.00603) (0.00173) 
KNOWS-DH 0.0333 0.0207 0.00433 -0.0465 -0.0118 
 (0.0244) (0.0141) (0.00273) (0.0334) (0.00766) 
Heuristics (years of payback)      
PBK-LM 0.164*** 0.111*** 0.0261*** -0.234*** -0.0670*** 
 (0.0466) (0.0329) (0.00887) (0.0672) (0.0202) 
PBK-MH 0.0320 0.118*** 0.0571*** -0.0899 -0.117*** 
 (0.0486) (0.0301) (0.0152) (0.0643) (0.0296) 
PBK-H 0.125*** 0.0849*** 0.0200** -0.179*** -0.0512*** 
 (0.0465) (0.0322) (0.00830) (0.0668) (0.0196) 
NEG-SAVINGS 0.157*** 0.106*** 0.0250*** -0.224*** -0.0642*** 
 (0.0376) (0.0269) (0.00753) (0.0544) (0.0167) 
DK-ANNUAL COSTS 0.133*** 0.0901*** 0.0212*** -0.190*** -0.0544*** 
 (0.0423) (0.0296) (0.00777) (0.0608) (0.0182) 
Inattention variables      
POSTAL INFO 0.0582** 0.0395** 0.00929** -0.0832** -0.0238** 
 (0.0236) (0.0163) (0.00411) (0.0338) (0.00994) 
INDIRECT INFO 0.140*** 0.0949*** 0.0223*** -0.200*** -0.0573*** 
 (0.0295) (0.0214) (0.00617) (0.0427) (0.0134) 
INATTENTIVE INFO 0.338*** 0.230*** 0.0540*** -0.483*** -0.138*** 
 (0.0555) (0.0410) (0.0124) (0.0786) (0.0270) 
HIGH UNOBSERVED COSTS 0.0468** 0.0318** 0.00746* -0.0669** -0.0192** 
 (0.0223) (0.0153) (0.00383) (0.0320) (0.00933) 
INATTENTIVE COSTS 0.140*** 0.0951*** 0.0224*** -0.200*** -0.0574*** 
 (0.0218) (0.0167) (0.00537) (0.0319) (0.0107) 
Low income high cost indicator     
LIHC 0.0834** 0.0566** 0.0133** -0.119** -0.0341** 
 (0.0365) (0.0252) (0.00632) (0.0524) (0.0153) 
LILC 0.0174 0.0118 0.00277 -0.0248 -0.00712 
 (0.0359) (0.0244) (0.00576) (0.0513) (0.0147) 
HILC 0.0104 0.00707 0.00166 -0.0149 -0.00426 
 (0.0304) (0.0206) (0.00486) (0.0434) (0.0124) 
UNDISCLOSED 0.0340 0.0670*** 0.0292*** -0.0687* -0.0615*** 
 (0.0300) (0.0188) (0.00854) (0.0404) (0.0168) 
Demographic characteristics      
ACTIVE -0.0539** -0.0366** -0.00859** 0.0770** 0.0221** 
 (0.0212) (0.0146) (0.00371) (0.0304) (0.00896) 
SINGLE 0.0632*** 0.0429*** 0.0101** -0.0904*** -0.0259*** 
 (0.0222) (0.0156) (0.00401) (0.0319) (0.00954) 
ELDERLY 0.0325 0.0220 0.00518 -0.0464 -0.0133 
 (0.0223) (0.0153) (0.00369) (0.0320) (0.00928) 
DEGREE -0.0418** -0.0284** -0.00667* 0.0597** 0.0171** 
 (0.0202) (0.0139) (0.00345) (0.0290) (0.00844) 
DAMP 0.0482** 0.0327** 0.00769** -0.0689** -0.0197** 
 (0.0193) (0.0134) (0.00339) (0.0277) (0.00815) 
Observations 784     
Pseudo R2 0.136     
LR χ2 289.34***     
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Next, in Table 6, we report our estimates of the discount rate whose standard error is 
calculated using the ‘delta method’ for non-linear post-estimations. The fourth column 
reports the estimates of the model without behavioural controls which generates a discount 
rate of around 41%, providing support for Hypothesis 1a,  that the households’ discount rate 
is significantly higher than the market rate of interest. It also provides support for Hypothesis 
1b, that the discount rate significantly affects the adoption decision (p-value=0.05). Both 
results still hold when we control for heuristics measures of the returns from adoption via the 
length of payback time (associated with a slightly higher discount rate of 51%, p-value= 0.07, 
see Column 2). This is due to the overestimation of the coefficient on annual costs in the 
classic model (see DH-BILL and INTERFACE in Table 5) by around 20%. Intuitively, 
behaviour that is driven by a simple payback period (UC/S) compared to the discounted 
calculation (UC/δ⋅S), would be consistent with an overestimate of the true time-value of 
money. Therefore, neglecting the heuristic behaviour produces an implied discount rate that 
is lower than would otherwise be expected without controlling for it.  
In contrast, the discount rate falls to 27.8% when we control only for inattention but it is no 
longer significant (p-value= 0.115, see column 3).  Similar results are obtained when we 
control for both inattention and heuristic decision making. The interest rate reduces to 36%, 
but again it is insignificant (p-value= 0.141, see column 1) 12 . In both cases, although 
insignificant, the discount rate is smaller than in the classic model. The significance of its 
component suggests that the upward bias works through the upfront costs as its coefficient 
falls by around 27% in absolute terms after controlling for inattention alone. This is plausible 
if inattention leads consumers to heavily discount energy costs relative to upfront costs.  
Overall our results suggest that, consistent with the EEP, consumers’ decision making 
discounts at rates that are higher than the market interest rate. We also find that leaving the 
behavioural drivers unaccounted for biases the discount rate away from zero, suggesting that 
they are  major drivers of the bias in the calculations of the classic discount rate. 
                                                 
12 Despite the interest rate being insignificant in both model 1 and 3 (Table 6), the cost variables (DH-BILL and 
INTERFACE) are individually and jointly significant (LR Chi2=7.17; p-value = 0.028) suggesting overall 
economic significance of the full model, à la McCloskey (Ziliak and McCloskey, 2008). 
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The strength of these findings is investigated by assessing a series of diagnostic checks 
(Table 6). The full model (Column 1) is tested against the specifications in which the 
behavioural variables are sequentially excluded (Columns 2 to 4). The likelihood ratio (LR) 
test, Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Pseudo-R2 indicate that the fully nested model 
best fits the data. In comparison, the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) indicates that the 
inattention model (Column 3) provides a better fit. Hence, one cannot out-and-out favour the 
full model (Column 1) over the rival specification (Column 3).  
Indeed, alternative diagnostic tests shed little light on a ‘preferred’ model: upon estimating 
the generalised residuals (Gourieroux et al., 1987) and implementing the Jarque-Bera test 
(correcting for sample size) it is possible to conclude that the residuals follow a normal 
distribution for all models. An additional diagnostic check tests for the significance of the 
square of the estimated link function (e.g. Pregibon, 1979; Ramsey, 1969) and leads to the 
tentative conclusion that all models are correctly specified, due to low power of the test. 
Finally, underpinning our analysis is the assumption that the coefficients are equal across all 
J categories of the ordered dependent variable, this is also known as the parallel assumption. 
As the LR-test reported above indicates that this assumption is violated (Chi2=111.12, p-
value=0.00), we have undertaken further tests which show that the parallel assumption does 
not hold only for a small number of variables.  The partial parallel regression model allows a 
specific set of coefficients to vary, which makes it possible to test whether the deviation from 
the baseline group’s proportionality for J-2 categories equals zero i.e. γ = 0 (Peterson and 
Harell, 1990). An empirical backward stepwise approach13 is implemented to identify the 
variables that violate the parallel assumption: INATTENTIVE COSTS and UNDISCLOSED14. 
After controlling for the deviation from parallel-lines γ for these variables15, the implied 
discount rate only falls by around 3 percentage points compared to the results in Column 1 
(Table 6). 
                                                 
13 Using Stata’s ‘stepwise’ command setting the threshold α=0.10. 
14 The coefficient deviations γ are insignificant for the 3rd cut-off point, therefore an additional constraint that 
asserts the parallel assumption for this point is applied. 
15 Results are reported in in Table A5 in Appendix 2. All estimates for the control variables and cut-off points 
are presented in Table A4. 
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Table 6: Estimated coefficients and implied discount rates for the ‘decision to connect’ to district heating 
  
 Ordered probit coefficients 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
βINTERFACE / βDH BILL 0.367 0.521* 0.293 0.419** 
 (0.250) (0.290) (0.186) (0.211) 
P-VALUE 0.141 0.073 0.115 0.047 
IMPLIED DISCOUNT RATE 0.358 0.518 0.278 0.412 
Experimental variables  
TENANT -1.391 -2.156** -1.498 -2.245** 
 (0.986) (0.963) (0.980) (0.958) 
DH-BILL -0.160** -0.154** -0.202*** -0.192*** 
 (0.0682) (0.0663) (0.0671) (0.0652) 
INTERFACE -0.0590* -0.0804** -0.0593* -0.0806** 
 (0.0356) (0.0349) (0.0355) (0.0347) 
TENANTxDH-BILL 0.0442 0.0805 0.0705 0.103 
 (0.0824) (0.0805) (0.0819) (0.0800) 
TENANTxINTERFACE 0.0642 0.0942** 0.0578 0.0884** 
 (0.0424) (0.0415) (0.0421) (0.0413) 
Inattention variables     
POSTAL INFO -0.304***  -0.305***  
 (0.109)  (0.108)  
INDIRECT INFO -0.644***  -0.634***  
 (0.132)  (0.131)  
INATTENTIVE INFO -1.691***  -1.657***  
 (0.243)  (0.241)  
HIGH UNOBSERVED COSTS -0.210**  -0.169  
 (0.105)  (0.104)  
INATTENTIVE COSTS -0.645***  -0.645***  
 (0.0994)  (0.0985)  
Heuristics (years of payback)     
PBK-LM -0.703*** -0.691***   
 (0.206) (0.201)   
PBK-MH -0.538*** -0.498**   
 (0.203) (0.200)   
PBK-H -0.479** -0.460**   
 (0.207) (0.203)   
NEG-SAVINGS -0.673*** -0.631***   
 (0.167) (0.164)   
DONTKNOW COSTS -0.595*** -0.618***   
 (0.198) (0.193)   
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations 784 784 784 784 
Log-likelihood -930.01 -992.10 -939.106 -1000.80 
Pseudo R2 0.127 0.070 0.119 0.061 
LR χ2 271.66*** 147.49*** 253.47*** 130.08*** 
LR χ2(Ho: m=1 vs. m=2,…,6) - 124.17*** 18.19*** 141.57*** 
AIC 1920.025 2034.197 1928.212 2041.60 
BIC 2059.957 2150.807 2044.822 2134.89 
Df 30 25 25 20 
Residual Pr(Skewness) 0.892 0.895 0.605 0.794 
Residual Pr(Kurtosis) 0.264 0.521 0.399 0.307 
Residual Normal (p-value) 0.892 0.805 0.612 0.573 
Link test x’β�2 (p-value) 0.396 0.878 0.229 0.963 
     
Notes:, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. See Table A.3 for controls and cut-off points.   
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6 Discussion and conclusion 
Residential heat demand poses a significant challenge to the United Kingdom’s 2050 
emission targets partly due to an energy inefficient housing stock and limited uptake of 
energy efficient technology. This paper aims to explore the reason for the slow uptake of 
energy efficient technologies by considering both traditional and behavioural theories used to 
explain the so-called energy efficiency paradox whereby consumers fail to adopt cost-
effective, energy efficient technologies over comparatively less efficient technologies. 
Empirically, we use the evidence on the decision to connect to a district heating system, using 
a specifically designed quasi-experimental survey of residential consumers in Birmingham, 
the second largest city in the UK. The results of our analysis lead to four key conclusions 
about the decision making process undertaken by consumers when faced with the opportunity 
to invest in energy efficient technology.   
First of all, in line with the neoclassical economic theory we find that the adoption decision 
of residential consumers is associated with internal rates of returns which are much higher 
than markets rates. Secondly, we find that this significantly and adversely affects the decision 
to adopt an energy efficient technology, providing evidence in support of the existence of the 
EEP. Central to this paper was also to test whether the size and significance of an estimated 
discount rate of around 40% could be explained by alternative theories of consumer 
behaviour. After controlling for behavioural factors, such as inattention and heuristic decision 
making, the estimated discount rate is significantly reduced. In particular we find evidence of 
both heuristics and inattention.  More precisely, when considering heuristic decision making 
based on the expected returns, we find that the likelihood of adoption is negatively and 
significantly affected by an increase in the payback period, with the probability of being 
likely to connect to a district heating system reaching a minimum at around 4 to 5 years. 
These results are consistent with the possibility that the information derived from the payback 
period might become ‘valueless’ beyond a certain time horizon, in which case consumers 
may use other quick-fire tactics to guide their decision. 
 Overall the approach taken in this paper makes a step forward in helping to address the 
research gap identified first by Jaffe et al. (2004) and later reaffirmed by Schliech et al. (2016) 
that “To observe that implicit discount rates are high, however, says nothing about the 
reason people make the decisions they make […]”. In this paper we have attempted to shed 
more light on the possible behavioural biases influencing how decisions are made. As  
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claimed by Schliech et al. (2016) this is not only important to interpretation of the discount 
rate but also for policy design, not least because the type of inattention, either bounded 
rationality or rational inattention, would determine the efficacy of policy. For example, the 
impact of carbon tax would be muted in the former but not in the latter.  
Besides behavioural considerations, it can be argued that the interest rate might indeed reflect 
the local or national market conditions (Jaffe et al. 2004). For instance, in our study the size 
of the discount rate may well reflect a region which contains consumers whose earnings fall 
below the national average and who are credit constrained. For these consumers the decision 
making process may have adjusted to the experience of high-cost/interest short-term credit, 
such as payday loans (Hirsch, 2013 and CMA, 2015). The experience of high premiums 
could have a dual impact, first, on the consumer’s ability to smooth over income shortfalls 
and, second, on the consumer’s expectations around the future prospect of being able to 
afford energy efficient goods and services. Empirical methods, and policy for that matter, 
could benefit by making a step towards recognising the disparate mechanisms underpinning 
consumer decision making as well as the impact of consumers’ socio-economic backgrounds. 
We believe that this is a fertile ground for future research in this area. 
Our findings are also relevant to the broader policy issue of consumer preferences for, and 
the supply of, impure public goods such as the reduction of environmental pollution. On the 
one hand, low-carbon, energy efficient goods exhibit several public characteristics, such as 
increasing energy supply security, reducing environmental degradation and pollution and 
creating innovation spill overs (Corradini et al., 2014; Ghisetti et al., 2015). On the other 
hand, the exclusivity of impure public goods brings about private gains associated with the 
adoption of energy saving and energy efficient technologies that range from the “warm glow” 
effect of the personal utility derived from the act of engaging, to the pecuniary private returns 
via savings and social signalling.  As suggested by Cornes and Sandler (1984) and by Finus 
and Rubbelke (2013) among others, the presence of ancillary additional private benefits and 
the spill overs to the provision of a public good are complementary to achieving 
environmental targets. This paper has identified important behavioural biases that exert a 
negative effect on the attitudes towards impure public goods and this has important 
repercussion on the successful implementation of environmental policies. The 
underestimation of the size of the ancillary private benefits from the uptake of environmental 
26 
technologies reduces not only the potential private benefits but also the societal benefit from 
energy efficient technologies, providing another useful insight for policy makers.  
Of course, a potential limitation of this paper arises from the fact that the participants in the 
survey do not have to commit to making a real investment, a form of ‘hypothetical bias’ 
(Hensher, 2010), so that the participants may fail to translate their intentions into action, or 
‘incongruence’ whereby plans are time-inconsistent (Pearce et al., 2003). Also, participants 
might not have been aware that deregulated district heating systems currently lock-in 
consumers, with lengthy contracts (up to 20 years), creating natural monopolies. As a result 
these systems have come under scrutiny by authorities in the UK (CMA, 2017) and Sweden 
(Söderholm and Wårell, 2011). Although these biases are alleviated in part by asking the 
participants to indicate their strength of interest in the energy efficient technology, the 
findings could be viewed as over optimistic about the decision to adopt DH. Despite these 
limitations, we believe that our results contribute to a deeper understanding of the interaction 
of economic and behavioural factors underlying a consumer’s decision to invest in a 
technology with relatively high initial cost but long lasting economic benefits and expected 
durability.   
To conclude, the results of our analysis indicate that both the classic perspective on the 
adoption of consumer technology, based on the implicit calculation of a discount rate, and the 
behavioural perspective, which considers the effect of inattention and heuristic decision-
making, contribute to explaining the apparent reluctance to adopt energy efficient 
technologies by domestic consumers. For this reason policy interventions aimed at promoting 
higher levels of adoption may need to account for the different forms of consumer behaviour 
and develop appropriate measures to target different types of consumers.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 Sample characteristics  
Table A.1: Comparing the sample statistics against Birmingham and England 
  
 Sample Birmingham, West Midlands and England 
Variable N % Median Birmingham 
Median / % 
England 
Median / 
% 
West 
Midlands 
Median / % 
Income variables*       
Annual income 645  18462 25014 27500  
Annual Energy Costs†       
Annual gas bill 683  611.56  666.76 700.13 
Demographic variables★       
ELDERLY 784 0.35  0.23 0.28  
SINGLE 784 0.21  0.42 0.34  
INACTIVE 784 0.36  0.36 0.30  
DEGREE 784 0.30  0.23 0.27  
TENANT 784 0.35  0.45 0.37  
Low-Income-High-Cost Indicator§     
LIHC 784 0.11   0.10 0.14 
LILC 784 0.12   0.15 0.15 
HIHC 784 0.22   0.40 0.41 
HILC 784 0.23   0.35 0.29 
UNDISCLOSED 784 0.33     
       
Notes: *Source: ONS (2014); †Source: EHS (2014) ★Source: ONS (2011a; 2011b)  §Source: EHS (2014) 
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Table A.2 Variable definitions and labels 
  
Variable name Definition 
CLASSICAL Vignette variables 
DH-BILL Annual DH bill allocated to household (£100s). 
INTERFACE Upfront cost of DH HIU allocated to household (£100s). 
INATTENTION variables 
1. Information acquisition and search method 
POSTAL INFO Household prefers information to be sent by post. 
INDIRECT INFO Household prefers indirect information delivery. 
INATTENTIVE INFO Household prefers to remain inattentive at the time of the survey. 
2. Inattentive to costs 
HIGH UNOBS COSTS Household requires at least £300 reduction in annual energy bill to join a DH scheme 
(given upfront costs are zero). 
INATTENTIVE 
COSTS 
Household unsure/does not know reduction in annual energy bill required to join DH 
scheme (given upfront costs are zero). 
HEURISTIC Variables  
Log (payback period)  
PBK Q2 Low-mid (2nd) quartile of payback period. 
PBK Q3 High-mid (3rd) quartile of payback period. 
PBK Q4 High (4th) quartile of payback period. 
NEG-SAVINGS Current annual bill < district heating bill. 
DONTKNOW COSTS Household is unsure/does not know energy or maintenance costs. 
CONTROL variables  
Low-Income-High Cost Indicator  
LIHC Residual income < 60% of median income and annual energy expenditure > median. 
LILC Residual income < 60% of median income and annual energy expenditure <median. 
HIHC Residual income > 60% of median income and annual energy expenditure > median. 
HILC Residual income > 60% of median income and annual energy expenditure < median. 
UNDISCLOSED Household representative prefers not to disclose energy bills and/or annual income. 
Demographic and housing variables  
INACTIVE All household residents are unemployed, not sought work in the last 2 weeks and/or 
unavailable to work in the following 4 weeks. 
SINGLE Household representative’s marital status is single. 
ELDERLY Household representative is aged over 60. 
DEGREE Highest educational attainment of the household is at least a degree qualification. 
TENANT Household does not own their property. 
DAMP At least one structural problem in the home e.g. damp, rot or leaky roof. 
KNOWS-DH Household representative has at least an ‘average’ understanding of DH schemes. 
        
29 
Appendix 2 Controls, diagnostic and specification checks 
Table A.3: Estimated coefficients for the controls and cut-off points for Table 7  
 Ordered probit coefficients 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Experimental controls       
KNOWS-DH -1.580 -1.810* -1.735* -1.938** -0.129 -0.153 
 (1.005) (0.989) (1.000) (0.985) (0.112) (0.109) 
KNOWS-DHxINTERFACE 0.0828 0.0957* 0.0907 0.102*   
 (0.0565) (0.0555) (0.0562) (0.0553)   
Low income high cost indicator       
LIHC -0.377** -0.421*** -0.348** -0.392** -0.404** -0.422*** 
 (0.166) (0.162) (0.165) (0.162) (0.165) (0.161) 
LILC -0.0930 -0.222 -0.180 -0.303** -0.119 -0.354** 
 (0.164) (0.159) (0.156) (0.152) (0.163) (0.151) 
HILC -0.0941 -0.126 -0.181 -0.206* -0.0660 -0.206* 
 (0.136) (0.134) (0.125) (0.123) (0.135) (0.122) 
UNDISCLOSED -0.380*** -0.476*** -0.421*** -0.530*** -0.375*** -0.541*** 
 (0.124) (0.120) (0.113) (0.110) (0.123) (0.110) 
Demographic characteristics       
ACTIVE 0.232** 0.264*** 0.243** 0.280*** 0.206** 0.253*** 
 (0.101) (0.0993) (0.101) (0.0987) (0.101) (0.0981) 
SINGLE -0.317*** -0.346*** -0.338*** -0.369*** -0.310*** -0.360*** 
 (0.104) (0.101) (0.102) (0.100) (0.103) (0.0998) 
ELDERLY -0.185* -0.298*** -0.196* -0.308*** -0.175 -0.289*** 
 (0.109) (0.105) (0.108) (0.105) (0.108) (0.104) 
DEGREE 0.184* 0.193** 0.171* 0.183** 0.184** 0.180** 
 (0.0941) (0.0914) (0.0935) (0.0909) (0.0937) (0.0905) 
DAMP -0.191** -0.202** -0.207** -0.220** -0.202** -0.239*** 
 (0.0898) (0.0883) (0.0893) (0.0879) (0.0892) (0.0873) 
CUT 1 -4.740*** -4.390*** -4.504*** -4.161*** -2.676*** -1.449*** 
 (0.860) (0.838) (0.852) (0.829) (0.241) (0.174) 
CUT 2 -4.094*** -3.811*** -3.867*** -3.590*** -2.036*** -0.886*** 
 (0.858) (0.836) (0.850) (0.827) (0.237) (0.171) 
CUT 3 -3.829*** -3.573*** -3.607*** -3.356*** -1.776*** -0.655*** 
 (0.857) (0.835) (0.849) (0.826) (0.235) (0.170) 
CUT 4 -1.913** -1.789** -1.718** -1.597* 0.117 1.077*** 
 (0.850) (0.830) (0.842) (0.822) (0.227) (0.173) 
       
Notes: † p < 0.15, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table A.4: Estimated coefficients for the controls and cut-off points for Table 8 
 Het. choice coefficients Partial prop. coefficients 
 (7) (8) 
Experimental controls  
KNOWS-DH -1.387* -1.568 
 (0.801) (1.009) 
KNOWS-DHxINTERFACE 0.0720 0.0819 
 (0.0450) (0.0567) 
Low income high cost indicator   
LIHC -0.345** -0.365** 
 (0.150) (0.167) 
LILC -0.0719 -0.0844 
 (0.149) (0.165) 
HILC -0.0431 -0.0788 
 (0.126) (0.137) 
UNDISCLOSED -0.329*** -0.209 
 (0.106) (0.134) 
Demographic characteristics   
ACTIVE 0.223** 0.240** 
 (0.0872) (0.101) 
SINGLE -0.262*** -0.308*** 
 (0.0922) (0.104) 
ELDERLY -0.134 -0.180* 
 (0.0927) (0.109) 
DEGREE 0.173** 0.191** 
 (0.0834) (0.0946) 
DAMP -0.199** -0.185** 
 (0.0792) (0.0901) 
CUT 1 -4.252*** 4.701*** 
 (0.747) (0.860) 
CUT 2 -3.684*** 4.270*** 
 (0.741) (0.859) 
CUT 3 -3.454*** 4.061*** 
 (0.738) (0.859) 
CUT 4 -1.733** 1.956** 
 (0.728) (0.850) 
   
Notes: † p < 0.15, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
  
31 
Table A.5 Estimated coefficients and implied discount rates for the ‘decision to connect’ to district heating 
using the behavioural specification, heterogeneous ordered probit and partial proportional ordered probit 
   
 Het. choice coefficients Partial prop. Coefficients 
Model (m) (5) (6) 
βINTERFACE / βDH BILL 0.334 0.389 
 (0.219) (0.250) 
P-VALUE 0.129 0.120 
IMPLIED DISCOUNT RATE 0.334 0.382 
Experimental variables  
TENANT -1.031 -1.476 
 (0.852) (0.987) 
DH-BILL -0.154*** -0.164** 
 (0.0578) (0.0684) 
INTERFACE -0.0514* -0.0637* 
 (0.0310) (0.0357) 
TENANTxDH-BILL 0.0503 0.0470 
 (0.0367) (0.0826) 
TENANTxINTERFACE 0.0339 0.0682 
 (0.0708) (0.0425) 
Inattention variables Y Y 
Heuristics (years of payback) Y Y 
Ln(σ):PBK-H -0.418***  
 (0.132)  
Ln(σ):UNDISCLOSED -0.191***  
 (0.073)  
Ln(σ):KNOWS-DHxINTERFACE -0.010*  
 (0.006)  
γ1: INATTENTIVE COSTS  -0.215** 
  (0.096) 
γ1: UNDISCLOSED  -0.277*** 
  (0.095) 
γ2: INATTENTIVE COSTS  -0.314*** 
  (0.106) 
γ2: UNDISCLOSED  -0.326*** 
  (0.103) 
Observations 784 784 
Log-likelihood -921.17 -919.66 
Pseudo R2 0.136 0.137 
LR χ2 289.34*** 292.36*** 
LR χ2(Ho: m=7,8 vs. m=1) 17.69*** 20.70*** 
LR χ2(Ho: m=7 vs. m=8) 3.02* 
AIC 1908.34 1907.32 
BIC 2062.27 2065.91 
Df 33 34 
Residual Pr(Skewness) 0.832  
Residual Pr(Kurtosis) 0.502  
Residual Normal (p-value) 0.779  
Link test x’β�2 (p-value) 0.708  
    
Notes:, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. See Table A.4 for controls and cut-off points. 
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